Bava Metzia 191

רבא סבר לה כרבי יונתן ומתרץ לקראי כרבי יונתן דתני' (שמות כב, יד) אם בעליו עמו לא ישלם משמע דאיתיה בתרוייהו ומשמע נמי דכי איתיה בחדא וליתיה בחדא פטור

'Raba, agreeing with R. Jonathan, interprets them on the basis of his views': 'The owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it good': this may imply that he is in his service either on both occasions or on one; in both cases he is free from responsibility. On the other hand, it is also written, 'But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good'; this too implies whether he is not with him on both occasions or only on one, he is liable. [Hence this contradiction is] to teach you: If he was with him at the time of the loan, he need not have been with him at the time of the injury or death; but though he were with him at the time of the injury or death he must also have been with him when the loan was made.

וכתיב בעליו אין עמו שלם ישלם משמע דליתיה בתרוייהו משמע נמי דכי איתיה בחדא וליתיה בחדא חייב

But may I not reverse it? — It is logical that the time of the loan is stronger [in remitting liability], in that it brings it [the animal] into his possession. On the contrary, are not injury and death more likely [to cancel responsibility], since he then becomes [actually] liable for accidents? — Were there no loan, what would injury and death effect?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., though the actual payment must be made on account of these, it is the fact of loan which conditions it. ');">¹</span>

לומר לך היה עמו בשעת שאלה אין צריך להיות עמו בשעת שבורה ומתה היה עמו בשעת שבורה ומתה צריך להיות עמו בשעת שאלה

But if not for injury and death, what liability is imposed by borrowing?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Surely, none at all! ');">²</span>

איפוך אנא מסתברא שאלה עדיפא משום דקא מייתי לה לרשותיה

— Even so, [the responsibility imposed by] borrowing is greater, since he thereby becomes responsible for his food.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The point of the discussion is this. It is evident that Scripture remits liability when the owner is in the bailee's service. Hence the question is, what actually imposes that liability which is to be remitted? And the Talmud answers that it is the act borrowing, rather than injury or death, which imposes it, since borrowing certainly imposes another liability, viz., that of food. ');">³</span>

אדרבה שבורה ומתה עדיפא שכן חייב באונסי'

R. Ashi said: Scripture saith, 'And if a man borrow aught of his neighbour,' [implying, aught of his neighbour,] but not his neighbour with it [sc. the animal], then, 'he shall surely make it good:' hence, if his neighbour is with him [when he borrows], he is free from liability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Thus, the verse itself intimates that the owner must not be with him, i.e., in his service, at the time of borrowing. ');">⁴</span>

אי לא שאלה שבורה ומתה מאי עביד ואי לאו שבורה ומתה שאלה מאי עביד אפילו הכי שאלה עדיפא שכן חייב במזונותיה

If so, what is the need of, 'the owner thereof being not with&nbsp;… But if the owner thereof be with it'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since, according to R. Ashi, it is intimated in the words he quotes. ');">⁵</span>

רב אשי אמר קרא (שמות כב, יג) וכי ישאל איש מעם רעהו ולא רעהו עמו שלם ישלם הא רעהו עמו פטור

— But for these, I should have thought that this [sc. aught of his neighbour] is the ordinary Scriptural idiom.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that no deduction could be made from the 'of' with respect to of non-liability when owner is in the service of the bailee. Now, however, that such is explicitly stated, and, moreover, the apparent contradiction intimates that the owner must be in his service at a particular time, the beginning of the verse, cited by R. Ashi, shews that the time of borrowing is meant. ');">⁶</span>

אי הכי בעליו אין עמו ואם בעליו עמו למה לי אי לאו הנך הוה אמינא האי אורחיה דקרא הוא

Rami b. Hama propounded: What [is the law] if he borrows it in order to commit bestiality therewith? Must the loan be as people generally borrow, whereas people do not borrow for such a purpose?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence he is not liable for accidents. ');">⁷</span>

בעי רמי בר חמא שאלה לרבעה מהו כדשיילי אינשי בעינן ולהכי לא שיילי אינשי או דלמא טעמא מאי משום הנאה והאי נמי הא אית ליה הנאה

Or perhaps the reason is because of the pleasure [he derives from the loan]: in which case here too he has pleasure?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That the borrower is usually responsible for accidents. ');">⁸</span>

שאלה ליראות בה מהו ממונא בעינן והאיכא או דלמא ממונא דאית ליה הנאה מיניה בעינן וליכא

What [again, is the law] if he borrows it for appearance's sake?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., that he should be thought wealthy, and so obtain credit. ');">⁹</span>

שאלה לעשות בה פחות מפרוטה מהו ממונא בעינן ואיכא או דלמא כל פחות מפרוטה לא כלום היא

Is it necessary that something of monetary value shall be lent,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In order to impose liability. ');">¹⁰</span>

שאל שתי פרות לעשות בהן פרוטה מהו מי אמרינן זיל בתר שואל ומשאיל ואיכא או דלמא זיל בתר פרות וכל חדא וחדא ליכא ממונא

which [condition is fulfilled] here? Or perhaps, something of monetary value, by which he [the borrower] directly benefits, is required — which is not [the case here]? What if he borrows it for work worth less than a <i>perutah</i>: must there be monetary value, and there is some? Or perhaps less than a <i>perutah</i> is of no account? What if he borrows two cows for a perutah's value of work? Do we say, consider<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'go' according to'. ');">¹¹</span>

שאל משותפין ונשאל לו אחד מהן מהו כולו בעליו בעינן והא ליכא או דלמא מההוא פלגא דידיה מיהא מיפטר

the borrower and lender, and there is [monetary value]? Or perhaps, the criterion is [the work of] the cows, and in [that of] each there is none?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This problem, of course, arises only on the supposition that a cow must do a perutah's worth of work. ');">¹²</span>

שותפין ששאלו ונשאל לאחד מהן מהו כולו שואל בעינן וליכא או דלמא בההיא פלגא דשיילי מיהת מיפטר

What if he borrows from partners, one of whom lends himself to him? Must all its owners [be in the bailee's service], which condition is absent here? Or perhaps, he after all bears no liability for his half?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Sc. of the partner who pledged his service. ');">¹³</span>

שאל מהאשה ונשאל בעלה אשה ששאלה ונשאל לבעל מהו קנין פירות כקנין גוף דמי או לא

What if partners borrow, and he [the animal's owner] lends himself to one of them? Must there be [a pledge of service] to all the borrowers, which, however, is absent here? Or perhaps, for that half [of the partnership] to which he is pledged there is no responsibility? What if he borrows from a woman, and her husband pledges his service? Or what if a woman borrows, and he [the owner] lends himself to her husband?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The reference is to the class of property designated [H] 'goods of plucking' — of which the husband enjoys the usufruct, whilst the principal belongs to the wife. ');">¹⁴</span>

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי האומר לשלוחו צא והשאל לי עם פרתי מהו בעליו ממש בעינא וליכא או דלמא שלוחו של אדם כמותו ואיכא

Is a title to usufruct as a title in the principal itself,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case the husband and wife are partners, and so this will depend on the previous problem. ');">¹⁵</span>

א"ל רב אחא בריה דרב אויא לרב אשי בעל פלוגתא דר' יוחנן ור"ל שליח פלוגתא דר' יונתן ור' יאשיה

or is it not?

בעל פלוגתא דר' יוחנן ור"ל דאיתמר המוכר שדהו לחבירו לפירות ר' יוחנן אומר מביא וקורא ריש לקיש אומר מביא ואינו קורא

Rabina asked R. Ashi: What if one says to his agent, 'Go and loan yourself [for service] on my account, together with my cow;' must there actually be its [sc. the bailment's] owner, which is absent here? Or perhaps, 'a man's agent is as himself;' hence the condition is fulfilled? — Said R. Aha, the son of R. Awia, to R. Ashi: As for the husband,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the problem concerning him. ');">¹⁶</span>

ר' יוחנן אומר מביא וקורא קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי וריש לקיש אומר מביא ואינו קורא קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

that is disputed by R. Johanan and Resh Lakish; with reference to an agent, that is disputed by R. Jonathan and R. Joshia.

שליח פלוגתא דר' יונתן ור' יאשיה דתניא האומר לאפוטרופוס כל נדרים שתהא אשתי נודרת מכאן עד שאבא ממקום פלוני הפר לה והפיר לה יכול יהו מופרין ת"ל (במדבר ל, יד) אישה יקימנו ואישה יפרנו דברי ר' יאשיה ר' יונתן אומר מצינו בכל מקום ששלוחו של אדם כמותו

'As for the husband, that is disputed by R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.' For it has been stated: If one sells his field to his neighbour for its usufruct, R. Johanan said: He must bring [the first fruits] and recite [the confession];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra, p. 518, n. 9. Though the usufruct only belongs to him, he can nevertheless say, And now, behold, I have brought the first fruits of the land, which thou, O Lord, hast given me (Deut. XXVI, 10). ');">¹⁷</span>

א"ל רב עיליש לרבא האומר לעבדו צא והשאל עם פרתי מהו תיבעי למ"ד שלוחו של אדם כמותו תיבעי למאן דאמר שלוחו של אדם אינו כמותו

Resh Lakish maintained: He brings [the first fruits], but does not recite [the confession]. 'R. Johanan said: He must bring [the first fruits] and recite [the confession]' because he holds that a title to usufruct is equal to a title to the principal itself. 'Resh Lakish maintained: He brings [the first fruits] but does not recite,' — a title to usufruct is not as a title to the principal itself.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. B.B. 136b. ');">¹⁸</span>

תיבעי למ"ד שלוחו של אדם כמותו הני מילי שליח דבר מצוה הוא אבל עבד דלאו בר מצוה לא או דלמא אפי' למ"ד אין שלוחו של אדם כמותו ה"מ שליח אבל עבד יד עבד כיד רבו דמיא

'With reference to an agent, that is disputed by R. Jonathan and R. Joshia.' For it has been taught: If one says to his epitropos,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' His general steward, appointed in loco domini. ');">¹⁹</span>

אמר ליה מסתברא יד עבד כיד רבו דמיא

'All vows which my wife may vow from now until I return from such a place, annul for her,' and he does so, I might think that they are annulled, therefore Scripture writes, Her husband may establish it, or her husband may make it void:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Num. XXX, 14. ');">²⁰</span>

בעי רמי בר חמא בעל בנכסי אשתו

this is R. Joshia's view. R. Jonathan said: We find in the whole Torah that a man's agent is [legally] as himself.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the vows are annulled. The same reasoning applies to the problem under discussion. ');">²¹</span> R. 'Ilish asked Raba: What [is the law] if one says to his slave, 'Go and loan yourself together with my cow'? The problem arises whether it be maintained that a man's agent is as himself or not. [Thus:] The problem arises on the view that a man's agent is as himself, for that may apply only to an agent who is subject to [Scriptural] commands, but not to a slave, who is not subject thereto.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra, 71b and 72a. ');">²²</span> Or, on the other hand, even on the view that a man's agent is not as himself, that may hold good of an [independent] agent, but as for a slave, 'the hand of a slave is as the hand of his master'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., having no independent existence, his actions are certainly like those of his master. ');">²³</span> — He replied: It is logical that 'the hand of a slave is as the hand of his master.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence it is accounted as though the owner is in the borrowers service. ');">²⁴</span> Rami b. Hama propounded: Does the husband rank as a borrower in his wife's property,